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SACRIFICING PEOPLE, PROTECTING HATE: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTI-MILITIA STATUTES AND THE
INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE EXCEPTION TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS LEGAL PROTECTIONS
FOR MEMBERS OF GROUPS TARGETED BY HATEMOTIVATED VIOLENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
No government other than that of God, no obedience except for the laws of

God, no submission except to the will of God, no nation except that of our race
given to us by God, for we war against princes and principalities which being
of this world, are the creations of the devil.'
Hate literature reeks of intimidation and threatens violence. Whether motivated
by anti-government notions or race supremacy, hate permeates some segments of
this society. Far right hate and patriot groups exist in the U.S., 2 and the Southwest
is no exception. While New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and Texas each harbor
active hate groups,3 ten such groups were documented in New Mexico in 1998."
Hate and patriot groups, often viewed as existing only on the fringes of society,
continue to grow in popularity,- and are often violent.6 Together, the presence of
hundreds of hate and patriot groups in the U.S. and the occurrence of thousands of

1. Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections No. N84-38-C 1985 WL 5573, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19,
1985), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting ARYAN NATIONS, MARCH SEPARATELY
IFYOU MUST BUT SmIKE TOGEmhER) [hereinafter Murphy 1].
2. In 1998,435 active patriot groups were documented in the 50 states. See Southern Poverty Law Center,
Active PatriotGroups in the UnitedStates in 1998, INTELUGENCE REP., Spring 1999, at 26-27.
In 1998, 537 active hate groups (not including patriot groups) were documented in 46 states. See
Southern Poverty Law Center, Active Hate Groupsin the UnitedStates in 1998, INTEwGENCE REP., Winter 1999,
at 38-39.
3. New Mexico's neighbors, Arizona, Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah hosted thirteen, five, seven,
nineteen, and six hate groups in 1998, respectively. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Active HateGroups in the
United States in 1999 (visited April 14, 2000) <http://www.splcenter.org/ip-index.htnl>. Arizona, Colorado,
Oklahoma, Texas and Utah hosted twelve, eight, five, fifty-two, and three patriots groups in 1998, respectively.
See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, Spring 1999, at 26-27.
4. In 1998 the following patriot groups were documented in New Mexico: American Constitutional Militia
Network, Division II, Albuquerque; Constitutional Task Force, Albuquerque; New Mexico Citizens Regulated
Militia, Southern Command, Albuquerque; U.S. Taxpayers Party, Albuquerque; Four Corners Patriot Militia,
Farmington; Ministry of Salvation, Mountainair New Mexico Militia, Mountainair, Rangers Outreach Center,
Pecos; New Mexico Citizens Regulated Militia, Northern Command, Santa Fe; Santa Fe County Militia, Santa Fe.
See Southern Poverty Law Center, supranote 2, Spring 1999, at 26-27. The Christian Crusade for Truth in Deming,
N.M. and the World Church of the Creator in Rio Rancho, N.M. were the sole documented hate groups in New
Mexico in 1999. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Active Hate Groups in the United States in 1999 (visited April
14, 2000) <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceprojectlip-index.hunl>.
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in New Mexico indicates that patriot activity exists in New
Mexico, however, most groups operate underground and are difficult to monitor and track. See interview with
Susan Seligman, New Mexico Regional Coordinator of Anti-Defamation League, Albuquerque, N.M. (Feb. 15,

2000).
5. The distribution of hate propaganda on the internet increased by 60% in 1998. See Southern Poverty
Law Center, supra note 2, Winter 1999, at 6.
6. See Southern Poverty Law Center, PatriotMovement Poses Continued Threat: Groups are Growing
in Number, Hardening in Attitude (visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ipindex.htmbl>; CAPTAIN ROBERT L. SNOW, THE MILrA THREAT: TERRORISTS AMONG US 17 (1999).
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hate crime incidents on national7 and local levels' indicate that hate-motivated
violence threatens the lives of thousands of members of society.9
Recall the gruesome and violent circumstances surrounding recent hate crimes.
Mathew Shepard, a gay man, was beaten with a pistol, hung on a wooden fence, and
left for dead in Wyoming." James Byrd, Jr., a black man, was chained to the back
of a truck by his ankles and dragged to his death by white supremacists in Texas."
Hate crimes and hate-related murders send the ultimate message of hatred to the
public. Like the impact of hate propaganda,' 2 the message sent by hate crimes,
especially if highly publicized, undoubtedly adversely impacts members of groups
targeted by the hate-motivated violence. In the aftermath of a hate crime, targeted
groups, such as immigrants, homosexuals, Jewish people and people of color, may
feel unsafe and unable to function or participate freely in the community.' 3 The
struggle of functioning in society as a black man after the slaying of James Byrd,
Jr. is unimaginable.' 4 The fear associated with being a homosexual alone in the
street at night after the hanging of Matthew Shepard is undeniable.' 5 Thousands of
people living in communities where hate-motivated incidents occur likely suffer
similar feelings in the shadow of a hate crime.' 6
In spite of amendment 14 to the U.S. Constitution, which prevents a state from
denying equal protection to all people within its borders, 7 the legal structure in the
7. In 1998, a total of 7,755 hate incidents were reported in 46 states. 4,321 were based on race; 1,390 were
based on religion (of which 1,081 were anti-Jewish); 1,260 were based on sexual orientation; and 754 were based
on ethnicity or national origin. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports:Hate CrimeStatistics
7 (1998) (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.fbi. gov/ucr/98hate.pdf> [hereinafter FBI Report].
8. The F.B.I. documented 40 bias-motivated incidents against persons in New Mexico in 1998. See id. at
14.
9. The F.B.I. statistics do not track hate crimes in many cities, and the statistics reflect incidents "reported
only after law enforcement investigation revealed sufficient evidence that the offender's actions were motivated,
in whole or in part, by bias." See id. at I. The actual number of hate crimes that occur in New Mexico is
significantly higher than the F.B.I. figures indicate. See interview with Seligman, supra note 4.
10. This incident occurred on Oct. 6, 1998 in Wyoming. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supranote 2,
Winter 1999, at 9.
II. This incident occurred on June 7, 1998 in Jasper, Texas. See id.
12. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2320, 2336 (1989) ("The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate for the victims. Victims
of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in
the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension,
psychosis, and suicide.").
13. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort ActionforRacial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 133, 137 (1982) ("The psychological responses to [racial] stigmatization consist of
feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred.... It is no surprise, then, that racial stigmatization injures its
victims' relationships with others.").
14. See Matsuda, supra note 12, at 2336 ("Victims [of racial harassment] are restricted in their personal
freedom. In order to avoid receiving hate messages, victims have had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their
homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify their behavior
and demeanor.").
Race-based hate crimes comprised 4,321 out of 7,755, or 55.7%, of all bias-motivated crimes in 1998.
See FBI Report, supra note 7, at 7. Anti black bias-motivated incidents comprised 2,901, or 67.1%, of all racebased hate crimes in that same year. See id.
15. Anti-gay motivated incidents are rapidly increasing. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Serious Violence
Against Gays Said to Rise, INTELIGENCE REP., Spring 1999, at 4.
16. 9,722 victims of hate-motivated incidents were documented in 1998. See FBI Report, supranote 7, at
7.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting any state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws").
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United States appears to provide fertile ground for hate activity and hate-motivated
violence. As a result, the legal community faces the challenge of envisioning and
developing laws that protect both freedom of expression and people who are
targeted by hate-motivated violence, as required by the constitution.
In promulgating anti-hate legislation, Canada has recently addressed this precise
issue. Although Canada has less rigid constitutional provisions that protect the
freedom of expression than the U.S., Canada presents an intriguing case study.
Canada and the U.S. enjoy a unique relationship considering their shared border and
shared allegiance to a democratic form of government. In addition, as the North
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) braids the economic, social and political
strands of each NAFTA country together, further integration and interdependence
between Canada and the U.S. will likely continue in the coming years. This
solidarity provides sound reason to share information, social and legal concerns, and
solutions to problems.
Like Canada, the U.S. should develop federal legislation that will protect all
members of society from hate-motivated violence. Two legal solutions with the
potential to protect members of groups targeted by hate-motivated violence are antimilitia statutes and the exclusion of hate-motivated speech and conduct from First
Amendment protection via the incitement to imminent lawless violence exception.
Federal codification of both possible solutions would be the most effective way to
address the national problem presented by hate-motivated violence.
This Comment has the following structural components: part I provides an
overview of the state of the U.S. with regard to factions of the far and extreme right
movement in the U.S.; part I analyzes U.S. law concerning anti-militia and antiparamilitary training statutes and incitement to imminent lawless violence cases;
part IV critiques the protections afforded targeted groups under these areas of law;
part V examines the Canadian approach to far and extreme right hate-motivated
violence; part VI discusses the need for alternative federal legislation to protect
targeted groups; and part VII concludes this Comment.
II. THE FAR AND EXTREME RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to analyze the problem presented by increased and pervasive violence
against members of groups targeted by the far and extreme right, it is necessary to
have a basic understanding of the far and extreme right movement in the United
States."8 The right side of the political spectrum is incredibly complex and replete
with debate among its factions.' 9 This Comment will focus on two general factions:
the regressive populists' and the openly racist far right. Regressive populists
include patriot groups and armed militias.2 The racist far right movement includes

18. This Comment does not attempt to provide a complete background of the far and extreme right
movement. Specific factions have been selected and will be analyzed in general terms and brief form.
19. See CHiP BERi.ET, EYEs RIGHT 18 (1995).

20. Populism refers to a political position that favors the interests of the individual as opposed to the
interests of the government or large corporations. See ROBERT CRAwFORD ET AL., THE NORTHWEST IMPERATMIE:
DOCUMENING ADECADE OF HATE A-6 (1994).

21. See BERLEr, supra note 19, at 16.
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the Ku Klux Klan, Christian Patriots, racist skinheads, and neo-Nazis. 22 Both
factions have militant or anti-democratic ideologies.23
Defining the factions of far and extreme right groups presents a multitude of
problems. First, when members of the far and extreme right movement share
common beliefs, their ideologies may overlap (i.e., a neo-Nazi skinhead may also
belong to a race supremacist church or militia).2 This factor may make monitoring
groups difficult. Second, because the groups typically operate secretly, the precise
location and number of groups are difficult to ascertain.' Thus, numerous obstacles
are inherent in documenting information about factions of the far and extreme right.
Hatred comes in many forms, but never without someone or something to project
the hatred upon. Patriots and militias harbor disdain or hatred for the government.26
The extreme racist right typically targets people of color, Jewish people, and
homosexuals.27 In the eyes of many far and extreme right groups, the U.S. has
become a battleground and they are mobilizing to fight.'
A.

Patriots
"Patriot" defines a broad spectrum of far and extreme right groups, all of which
hold a revolutionary vision and anti-government sentiment. 29 Additionally, members
of these groups enjoy some commonalities as the majority of patriots are white
males. 3° Not all patriot groups, however, adhere to a racist ideology. 31 Militias,
common law courts, and Posse Comitatus groups typify three prevalent forms of
3
These groups share complex theories concerning citizenship and
patriot groupsY.
the law.
1. Sovereignty, Militias, and the Posse Comitatus
To me, true freedom, is living my life free from the regulation or control of any
governmental body or anyone else. But we must realize a very powerful truth
about freedom. You cannot have freedom without self-responsibility.. .. I do
not need anyone else to control me.3

22. See id.
23. See id. at 18.
24. See id.
25. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 18.
26. See id at 16; KENNETHSTERN, A FORCE

UPON THE PLAIN 42-43 (1996).
27. See BE.RLET, supra note 19, at 16-17. Immigrant populations are a popular target of the extremist right
on an international level. See AUREL BRAUN, THE EXTREME RIGHT: FREEDOM AND SECURrrY AT RISK 13-15

(1997).
28. See BRAUN, supra note 27, at 14-15.
29. See DAVID A. NEWERT, INGOD'S COUNTRY 4 (1999).
30. See SNOW supranote 6, at 18.
31. See BRAUN, supra note 27, at 62. Often times only the leadership, and not individual militias members,
have a white-supremacist agenda. See NIEWERT, supra note 29, at 8.
32. See generally Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, Spring 1999, at 26-27.
33. Jesse Enloe, Do We Understand Freedom, or Fear it? (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://
texasrepublic.coml understand.html>.
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The majority of patriot groups believe in sovereignty or complete freedom from
government interference.34 However, patriots believe whole-heartedly in the
constitution of the U.S.35 People who feel disenfranchised, often out of rural areas,
gravitate toward patriot groups whose appeal may offer a sense of hope.3 6 Racist
undertones often come into play in the form of scapegoating, as identifiable groups
are blamed for the patriot's diminished social or economic status.37
In addition, members believe that the existing federal government actively
conspires against powerless citizens. 3' The government is "corrupt and ruthless
beyond redemption."3 9 Sovereign citizens do not accept authority from the state or
federal government.' Therefore, a primary premise of their political status is
refusing to pay taxes, apply for driver's licenses, or obey the laws of state and
federal government.4
Militias represent a highly organized form of patriot groups. Militias typically
arm themselves, engage in paramilitary training, stockpile weapons, and wear
uniforms.42 The majority of active militias or groups of sovereign citizens follow
principles of sovereignty and adhere to a literal interpretation of the constitution and
the bill of rights.43 The right to bear arms provision of the second amendment
provides the foundation of their ideology."
Posse Comitatus groups, another type of patriot group, believe in the power of
46
the county.4 5 Posse Comitatus members are hostile to any law other than their own.
This hostility stems from a belief that all levels of government beyond the county
are illegitimate.47 Posse members reflect a diverse cross-section of the extreme
right. Some members may be strictly anti-federal and anti-state government while
others may be racist." Posse Comitatus groups defer to the power of the county
sheriff. However, this deference may apply only as long as the sheriff fulfills his
duty as defined by the Posse Comitatus.49 Sheriffs have an incredible amount of
34. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 181. See, e.g., NEIWERT, supra note 29, at 74 (providing the example of
Militia of Montana member John Trochmann, who, while in jail, "filed 'sovereign citizen' documents that declared
him a 'free, white, Christian man"' outside the jurisdiction of the state and federal governments).
35. See SNOW, supranote 6, at 181.
36. See id.at 18 ("The movement helps these frustrated individuals manage their feelings ofresentment and
anger, because joining a militia unites them with others who have the same problems and fears. There is comfort
in knowing they are not alone."); see also NIEWERT, supra note 29, at 6-7.
37. See BERLET, supra note 19, at 21; NIEWERT, supra note 29, at 6. For example, militia members may
believe that "affirmative action and welfare programs help blacks and other minority groups to the detriment of
Caucasians." See Jarrod Braxton Bazemore, Comment, WarriorMercenariesorToy Soldiers: The Rise of Militias
in the UnitedStates, 22 L. & PSYcHOL. REV. 219, 223 (1998).
38. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 16.
39.

Id.

40. See id. at 182.
41. See id. at 181-182.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 14-15.
Susan P. Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, 8 CARoZO STUD. L & Lrr. 65, 72 (1996).
Bazemore, supra note 37, at 221.
NIEWERT, supra note 29, at 52; STERN, supra note 26, at 50.
S.TERN, supranote 26, at 50.

47. See id.

48. See id.
49. The following is an excerpt from Posse Comitatus literature:
WE HAVE NOT given up our oath as soldiers and protectors of these United States of America
to war against enemies abroad and WITHIN die borders of these United States.... The Sheriff
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discretion in utilizing law enforcement power, and Posse Comitatus groups are
essentially law enforcement agencies available at the request of the sheriff.'
2.

Common Law Court Systems
We are the Church & We are the State. We are the Sanhedrin & We are the
Senate. And We are committed to preparing the way for Theocratic Government
under Christ Jesus' Holy Kingdom to Reign in Truth, Justice & Peace upon this
Earth.5 '

Common Law court factions seek a complete revolution through a highly
organized system of "Common Law. 52 Patriot "Common Law" is different from
common law under the American judicial court system in that it is derived from
God's Law and, therefore, it trumps American law, which is not legitimized by
God.53 Common Law adherents nevertheless follow American law,54 but only to the
extent that it does not conflict with God's Law. "Where any conflict exists between
God's Word, the Law, and man's law, God's Law must be obeyed and takes
precedent over man made civil law ... .s5The ideology rests on the premise that
whose ultimate goal is to "create an idealized
patriots are part of a social movement
'white, Christian society."' 56 Because the Common Law courts combine religion
and the law, Common Law court doctrine frequently references both the Bible and
the "organic constitution,"'5 which includes only the original constitution and the
bill of rights, compromising only the first ten amendments.58
The Common Law court system draws its authority from the constitution's
reference to "one supreme court. ' 59 Because the U.S. Supreme Court does not carry
the title "one supreme court," the creation of a separate court system is justified.'
These courts have their own system of adjudication and often enforce their laws and
carry out their sentences through militias. 61 Any person who demonstrates his or her
allegiance to the U.S. court system is considered to have committed treason. 62 There
attempted to
have been several incidents where Common Law court members
63
threaten or coerce individuals to comply with the Common Law.

is to be obeyed and respected ONLY if he is a God fearing befiever and son of Yahshua/Christ
...If

you find that your Sheriff is in default of this, then he is to be removed from office by

whatever means necessary.
Sheriff's Posse Comitatus (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.posse-comitatus.org>.

50. See CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 2.17.
51. Christian National Common-Law Court homepage (visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http://www.christian
commonlaw-gov.org>.
52. See NIEWERT, supra note 29, at 3.
53. See Koniak, supra note 43, at 71.
54. American law is often referred to as "civil law" or "statutory law." See id.
55. CRAWFORD, supra note 20,at 2.10
56. See id. at 2.7
57. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 181; Koniak, supranote 43, at 71.
58. See Koniak, supra note 43, at 72.
59. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
60. See Koniak, supra note 43, at 72.
61. See id. at 95-96; NiEwERT, supra note 29, at 3.
62. See Koniak, supra note 43, at 95.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1569-70 (7th Cir. 1990) (concerning a mail threat
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B.

Overt Right Racism: Ku Klux Klan, ChristianPatriots,ChristianIdentity, &
Racist Skinheads
The foundation of the majority of overtly racist organizations lies in the concept
of race supremacy. Although supremacist ideologies in the United States are not
exclusive to the white race, the majority of race-biased hate groups are white
supremacist.' White supremacy can be defined as "an individual, groups or action
embodying the ideological notion of biological, genetic, intellectual or other
' Hate groups
inherent superiority of whites over other population groups."65
that
couple a white supremacist agenda with a militant approach to reclaiming the white
race pose a dangerous threat to targeted groups.
1. Christian Patriots
In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, [I] solemnly Publish and Declare my
American National Status and rights to emancipate absolute my "res" in trust
from the foreign jurisdiction known as the municipal corporation of the District
of Columbia, a Democracy.... By this emancipation I return to66an estate of
primary sovereignty and freedom that persists all government(s).
Much like the Common Law Courts, a literal interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution anchors Christian Patriot ideology. Christian Patriots vow allegiance
to the "organic constitution."67 Most Christian Patriots disregard all amendments
subsequent to the bill of rights.6" Under their interpretation of the constitution, the
civil rights amendments-the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendmentshave no or only limited validity. A common rationalization for disregarding the civil
rights amendments is that they were not properly ratified.69 However, mainstream
legal discourse does not question the validity of these amendments.
Based on the rejection of the civil rights amendments, Christian Patriot ideology
draws a distinction between state citizens and "fourteenth amendment" or "federal
citizens."70 These citizens, specifically people of color and Jewish people, have
either diminished or non-recognizable citizenship because their citizenship has been
received by the federal government.7 ' On the other hand, state citizens, specifically
members of the Aryan race, have superior citizenship status as they derive their
citizenship from the original constitution and God.72 Because these groups do not

made to a circuit court judge by a sovereign citizen); KoN1AK, supra note 43, at 94-5 (referring to an incident where
a municipal court judge was threatened after refusing to honor the authority of the Common Law courts). See also
id. at 95.
64. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, Winter 1999, at 26-33.
65. CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at A-8.
66. STERN, supra note 26, at 82.

67. See CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 2.5.
68. See id.
69. See KONIAK, supra note 43, at 81.

70. See id. at 82.
71. See 4.
72. See id.
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acknowledge the civil rights amendments, "federal citizens" have diminished equal
protection or due process guarantees.73
The ultimate goal in the mind of a Christian Patriot is the establishment of a
white, Christian society.74 In direct conflict are "conspirators" who corrupt and
interfere with the potential to realize this goal. 75 There are numerous conspiracy
theories that identify the conspirators. "The tools of 'The Conspiracy' are racemixing, homosexuality, civil rights, income tax, abortion and gun control... [and]
any action or policy of the federal government, the United Nations, the media,
''
women, people of color, the state of Israel, [and] gay and lesbian organizations. 76
One of the most common conspiracy theories is based on the book entitled
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Protocols).7 Protocols purports to transcribe a
78
secret meeting of a Jewish leaders, detailing their plan to take over the world.
79 it is widely distributed
Although the book has been established as a forgery,
among white supremacist, particularly anti-Semitic, hate groups.'s While it is
difficult to gauge whether the book effectively convinces readers of the imminent
threat of a Jewish conspiracy, Protocolsserved to reinforce anti-Semitic beliefs for
the Nazi Party in Germany.8s As demonstrated by Protocols,anti-Semitism knows
no limits in its mission to portray Jewish people as the enemy. For example,
-Holocaust deniers or revisionists dismiss the Holocaust as a myth invented by
Jewish people. 2
At the core of Christian Patriot conspiracy theories lies the belief that Satan
works through the conspirators. 3 Jewish people, as well as people of color and
homosexuals, advance the cause of Satan through their very existence. Thus, the
conspiracy is against God and directly threatens the creation of a Christian nation."
2.

Christian Identity and the Ku Klux Klan
[Tihe great calling of our movement is to secure the preservation, protection and
advancement of the White race and to enrich our people spiritually, morally and
materially. We must begin to restore order in the places where we live and work.
...[We are] preparing for the coming disorder that will test the very survival
of the White Race and White Christian ideals."' a

73. See id.
74. See CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 2.4.
75. See id.
76. Id
77. This book allegedly dates back to the late 1800s and is referred to by a variety of names. See NIEWERT,
supra note 29, at 160 (Protocolsof the Seven Elders of Zion); SNOW, supra note 6, at 116 (Protocolsof the
Meetings of the Learned Eldersof Zion); STERN, supra note 26, at 45 (Protocolsof the Elders of Zion).
78. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 116.
79. See id. at 115-116; SiERN, supranote 26, at 45.
80. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 115; NEwERT, supranote 29, at 160; STERN, supra note 26, at 45-46.
81. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 115.
82. See BERLET, supranote 19, at 249-250. Germany has passed legislation prohibiting the distribution of
propaganda that denies the Holocaust. See BRAUN, supra note 27, at 127.
83. See BERLET, supra note 19, at 74.
84. See id.
85. Knights of the White Kamellia, Realm of Texas (visited Feb. 11, 2000) http.//www.eden.com/-titan>.
The above-quoted text is included under the heading "Our Dedication."
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Like Christian Patriots, Christian Identity churches teach God's Laws with an
overt white supremacist slant.8 6 The basis of the Christian Identity movement
formed in the mid-nineteenth century."' At the root of Identity theology is a creation
story that separates and condemns people of color and Jewish people." Under the
creation story, Jewish people are descendants of Satan,89 people of color are
subhuman "mud people," and white people are descendents of Abraham and the lost
tribe of Israelites.' In one version of the creation story, Eve bore the seed of both
Adam and Satan. When God cast Adam, Eve and Satan out of the Garden of Eden,
God declared that there would be eternal race conflict. While God's children, the
true Israelites, grew from Adam's seed, Satan's seed spawned Cain. Cain eventually
killed Able and went to live with the "mud people."' Identity theology sets up the
basis for race hatred and race violence by condemning miscegenation and
advocating racial purity.'
The Ku Klux Klan, a Christian Identity group, is arguably one of most overt,
racist factions of the extreme right.9' The KKK is the oldest organized hate group
in the U.S.' In the past, the KKK has claimed upwards of 50,000 members in the
United States.9" Although KKK membership has been dwindling over the past 30
years,' in 1998 the KKK grew from 127 to 163 active chapters 9 7 The American
Knights of the KKK was the fastest-growing KKK group in 1998.9
3. Racist Skinheads
A steadily growing faction of the far right," racist skinheads have a reputation
and propensity for violence." While the number of other violence-prone hate
groups have dropped, skinhead groups have experienced less of a decline.' The

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See
See
See
See
See
See

STERN, supra note 26, at 46.
id
id.
at4647.
id.
at46.
id.
id.
at46-47.

92. See Murphy 1,No. N84-38-C, 1985 WL 5573, at *2 (describing the doctrines of the Church of Jesus

Christ Chrisian/Aryan Nations and the Mountain Church of Jesus Christ the Savior).
93. See BERLETsupra note 19, at 176; BRAuN, supra note 27, at 21. The following is a quote from a KKK
group:
America has been clearly deceived by the lies of the race-mixers and mongrelizers into believing
an insane notion-that two people can occupy the same place at the same time in harmony.
Throughout history, when the attempt is made to force a condition of sharing space, racial
conflict erupts-and continues until one race dominates the other.... Therefore, the great
calling of our movement is to secure the preservation, protection and advancement of the White
race.
Knights ofthe White Kamellia, supra note 85.The above quotation can be found under the heading "Policy Goals
of the White Supremacist."
94. See CRAwFORD,supra note 20, at 1.7.
95. See BRAUN, supra note 27, at 58.
96. See id.
97. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, Winter 1999, at 7.
98. See id.

99. See BRAUN, supra note 27. at 61.
100. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Skinhead Violence: It's Come Back Again, INTELIGENCE REP.,
Winter 1997, at 16.
101. See BRAUN,supra note 27, at 61.
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skinhead movement, which originated in England, attracts mainly young, white,
males.'0 2 Skinhead groups appeal primarily to disenfranchised, working-class
youth."3
Some racist skinheads adhere to neo-Nazi ideology that descends directly from
the German Nazi party and the politics of Hitler and the Third Reich." The primary
factor that distinguishes neo-Nazis from other white supremacists is their zealous
revolutionary posture.0" Although all neo-Nazi skinheads are racist, not all
skinheads are racist or white supremacist."° Some skinheads may be antiChristian. 7 Aryan Nations, a neo-Nazi group that also subscribes to Christian
Identity beliefs, is one of the most notorious hate groups in the nation.'
Skinhead groups are generally not well organized and lack formal ties to racist
organizations. "°However, professional racists have successfully recruited members
of skinhead groups."0 For example, in Berhanu v. Metzger,"I a lower court in
Oregon linked the activities of Tom Metzger, founder of White Aryan Resistance,
a skinhead group located in California, to violence perpetrated by members of a
skinhead group in Portland, Oregon." 2
C. Summary of the Farand Extreme Right Movement in the United States
This brief snapshot of the movement provides some insight into the ideology and
doctrine of the far and extreme right. The U.S. has a complex and continuous
history of far and extreme right activity. Some factions of the far right are
sophisticated and their doctrine indicates a sound plan of action. "Among the
necessary activities [for a revolutionary infrastructure] are the generation and
dissemination of propaganda, recruiting, fund raising, self-defense and internal
discipline.... It is the continued enhancement, development, and expansion of such
which alone can lead to the attainment of the ultimate revolutionary
activities
' 3
goal."
With the abundance of hate propaganda, hate groups and paramilitary
organizations, the far and extreme right groups have been successfully building a
revolutionary infrastructure in the U.S. Whether hate-motivated violence is
perpetrated by a hate group or by lone individuals, the government cannot ignore
the pervasiveness of hate in this society. The F.B.IL Uniform CrimeReport statistics
for 1998 show a direct correlation between groups identified as enemies in the
doctrine and propaganda of far and extreme right groups and groups that are the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 1.6-1.7.
See Maj. Walter M. Hudson, Racial Extremism in the Army, 159 MiL. L.REv. 1, 21 (1999).
See CRAWFORD, supra note 20,at 1.8.
See id
See Hudson, supra note 103, at 21.

107.

See CRAWFORD, supra note 20,at 1.8-.9.

108. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 2, Winter 1999, at 7.
109. See Hudson, supra note 103, at 19-20.
110. See CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 1.7.
111. 850 P.2d 373 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
112. See Videotape: Hate on Trial: Challenging the First Amendment (Films for the Humanities & Sciences
1997) (on file with the Judicial Educ. Ctr., Univ. of New Mexico School of Law).
113. NATIONAL ALLIANCE, WHATISTHE NATIONAL ALLIANCE: IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL
ALuANcE 6 (1993).
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victims of hate-motivated violence."' The statistics on hate-motivated incidents and
the presence of hundreds of hate groups in the U.S. warrant keeping a critical eye
on the value of hate in society.
Im. AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-MILITIA STATUTES AND THE
INCITEMENT TO IMMINENT LAWLESS VIOLENCE EXCEPTION TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Members of groups targeted by hate-motivated violence may find legal protection
under several legal theories, including tort actions," especially libel actions,1 6 anticonspiracy laws," 7 anti-militia and anti-paramilitary training statutes," 8 and the
incitement to imminent lawless violence exception to the freedom of speech
provision of the first amendment." 9 Although each of the aforementioned theories
may provide legal protection to targeted groups, this Comment addresses only state
anti-militia and paramilitary training statutes and incitement to violence. These
areas have been selected because they have the ability to specifically address the
violence directed at members of groups targeted by hate groups prior to the actual
infliction of injury. Both theories implicate the freedom of speech provision of the
first amendment.
Backgroundof Freedom of Speech
The first amendment holds a revered status in the hearts and minds of most
Americans. A cornerstone of American culture and values, freedom of speech
promotes a "free trade in ideas"' and benefits society by encouraging truth,'
democracy,' and a way to air discontent."z The freedom of speech, therefore,
facilitates the "interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."''" Because of its direct impact on the political
process, the freedom of speech is a fundamental principle of the United States
Constitution. 12
A.

114. The highest number ofbias-motivated incidents were perpetrated against Jewish people, people of color
(including the categories of race and ethnicity), and homosexuals. See FBI Report, supra note 7, at 7.
115. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 13, at 150 (recognizing the following possible, though ultimately
unreliable, tort actions: assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation).
116. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,252 (1952) (recognizing the viability of a libel claim under
a statute where a publication exposed people of color to contempt or derision). But see Dworkin v. Hustler

Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1199 (concurring with the 7th Circuit that group libel claims are "highly
questionable at best").
117. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,919-20 (1982) (recognizing the viability

of a conspiracy action where some participants in a boycott perpetrated violence after a speech which contained
references to violence).
118. See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 219-20 (D.

Tex. 1982) (enjoining a militia from engaging in military activities under an anti-militia statute).
119. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (recognizing the incitement to imminent

lawless action as a category of constitutionally unprotected speech).
120. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,dissenting).

121. See id.
122. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270-71 (1964).
123. See id.

124. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

125. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
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For the above reasons, the free exercise of speech may be restricted only in
limited circumstances. The restriction of speech on the basis of its content is
generally impermissible."n However, restrictions on the content of speech may be
permitted if the expression is "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality."'2 7
Thus, the courts have carved out narrow categories or limited circumstances in
which the content of certain expressions do not warrant first amendment
protection.s In order to justify a content-based restriction on expression, the
regulation must be aimed at regulating the secondary effects of speech and be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 9 Courts determine whether
the speech in question merits constitutional protection, or whether it fits into one
of the exceptions to protected speech.' In the past the Supreme Court has
permitted restrictions on obscene materials, 3 ' child pornography,' 32 fighting
words,'33 incitement to imminent lawless activity,' 34 and false and/or deceptive
35
statements.
B.

State of the Law in the United States

1. State Anti-Militia and Anti-Paramilitary Training Statutes
Over half of the 50 states have enacted statutes that prohibit either unauthorized
private militias 136 or paramilitary training. ' Anti-militia statutes generally employ

126. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
127. See id at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
128. See id.
at 382-83.

129. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
130. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
131. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (refusing to extend first amendment freedom
of speech protection to obscene materials).
132. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (refusing to extend first amendment freedom of
speech protection to child pornography).
133. See Chapfinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (refusing to extend absolute freedom
of speech under the first amendment to words that may instigate a fight).
134. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (refusing to extend first amendment freedom of
speech protection to expressions that cause incitement to lawless activity).
135. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 627 (1985) (refusing to extend first
amendment freedom of speech protection to false statements).
136. See ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (1989); ARI. REv. STAT. § 26-123 (1991); FlA. STAT. ch. 870.06 (1999);
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-277 (1995); IDAHOCODE § 46-802 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29A.31 (West 1995); KAN.

STAT. ANN. § 48-203 (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38.440 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
37-B, § 342(2) (West 1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 65, § 35 (1998); MASS. GEN.LAWS ch. 33, §§ 129-31 (1985);
MICH.CoMP. LAWS § 750.402 (1991); MINN. STAT. § 624.61 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 33-1-31 (1990); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 203.080 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111:15 (1990); N.Y. ML.LAW § 240 (McKinney 1990);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-01-21 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-12-7 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.120
(1991); W. VA. CODE § 15-IF-7 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-8-104 (Ivfichie 1999).
137. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-301 to -303 (Michie 1997); COLO.REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-120 (West
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 27-101,27-102 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.06 (Harrison 1999); GA. CODEANN.
§ 38-2-277 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 46-802 (1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31 (West 1989); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 574.070 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §45-8-109 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1480 to 28-1482 (1995); N.J.

REV. STAT § 2C:39-14 (1995); N.Y. MiL LAW § 240 (McKinney 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20A-I to -4
(1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 127A- 148 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.660 (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5515 (1983

Spring 2000]

SACRIFICING PEOPLE, PROTECTING HATE

the following language: "No body of men.., shall associate themselves together
as a military organization for drill or parade in public with firearms, in this
state .... Despite the possibility that these statutes might infringe on the freedom
of assembly and freedom of speech provisions of the first amendment, the nation's
highest court has yet to confront the constitutionality of an anti-militia statute. One

lower court case that addressed this issue was Vietnamese Fishermen'sAssociation
v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. 39

In that case, the plaintiffs sought to enforce the state anti-militia statute and
14
enjoin the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) from participating in military activities in Texas. 0
Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit after an incident where the KKK's militia,
the Texas Emergency Reserve (TER), hung an effigy of a Vietnamese fisherman
from the rear deck of a boat. 14' The incident took place at a highly publicized
that the act was done in order to gain
event,' 42 and one member of the TER admitted
43
media attention and assert violence.'
The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.'" The statute reads as
follows: "[n]o body of men, other than the regularly organized State Military Forces
of this state and the troops of the United States, shall associate themselves together
as a military company or organization or parade in public with firearms in any city,
The prohibitory language implicated both the freedom
or town of this State .... ,,14
of assembly and freedom of speech provisions of the first amendment.
The court dismissed the freedom of assembly claim, reasoning that the language
of the statute did not infringe on the militia's first amendment freedom of assembly
guarantees.'" The "injunction ...in no way hinders defendants from meeting

together as a group. Rather, it simply limits their ability to engage in a certain
pattern of noncommunicative conduct. .... ,,4'Thus, the court concluded that
meeting as a group specifically for the purpose of military training is outside of the
scope of First Amendment freedom of assembly protections.'"
Similarly, the court found that the militia's activities were outside of the scope
of the freedom of speech provision of the first amendment. 49 In analyzing the
statute, the court concluded that the militia's activities constituted conduct, rather
than speech.'5 ° The specific activities of the TER included: 1) operating as a
military organization for six years; 2) facilitating military training through a
hierarchical command structure, including weapons, combat and war artistry

& Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-55-1 to 11-55-3(1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-314(1997); VA. CODE

ANN. § 18.2-433.2 (Michie 1996).
138.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.06 (Harrison 1999).

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
See id. at 201.
Seeid. at207.
See id at 206.
See id.
See id. at 216.
Id. at 216 n.14 (citing TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 5780, § 6 (West 1962)).
See id.

Id.
See id at 209.

149. See id.
150. See id. at 208.
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training; 3) carrying a TER flag and using a uniform system of dress; and 4) using
military-like vehicles.' Considering these activities, the court concluded that the
militia's activities involved "such minimal elements of communication" that the
activities were not "'speech' within the meaning of the First Amendment." '
The decision in Vietnamese Fisherman's Association reflects United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence that limits first amendment protection of conduct.'53
The nature of the activity, its context, and the environment in which the activity
occurs determine whether the first amendment protections extend to the conduct."5 4
Some forms of protected expressive conduct include flag-burning, '5 picketing, and
wearing uniforms.S 6 As a result, the first amendment protects expressive conduct,
but that protection
may be exposed to more governmental restriction than oral or
5
written words. 1
Assuming that the militia's activities constituted expressive conduct protected
by the first amendment, the court in Vietnamese Fishermen'sAssociationjustified
restricting the conduct under the three-part test set forth in United States v.
O'Brien.5 The O'Brien test permits restricting first amendment activities only
when 1) there is a substantial governmental interest; 2) the restriction is narrowly
tailored to meet the interest; and 3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of

free expression.

5

In applying the O'Brien test, the court reasoned that "[t]he inherent potential
danger of any organized private militia, even if never used ... is obvious."'" The
court further reasoned that since the power to regulate private armies lies with the
state, 61 the governmental interest in regulating militias was unrelated to the
suppression
of free speech. Thus, the court held that the O'Brien test was
162
satisfied.
The court also justified restricting the militia's activities under the "fighting
words doctrine.' 63 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court established that
words which "by their very utterance inflict injury [and] tend to excite an immediate
breach of the peace" are not entitled to first amendment protection.' 4 In applying
the fighting words doctrine, the court reasoned that "provocative statements by [the]
151. Seeid.at203-04.
152. Id. at 208.
153. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning a flag constituted expression
protected by the first amendment because 1) the conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace and 2) the state's
interest in preserving national unity did notjustify criminal conviction); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,41415 (1974) (holding that displaying an American flag upside down, with a peace symbol affixed constituted

expression protected by the first amendment).
154. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
155. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420.
156. See id at 404.
157. See id at 406.
158. 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
159. See id at 377 (finding that 1) the Government had a substantial interest in preventing the destruction
of Selective Service certificates; 2) the 1965 Amendment to the Military Training and Service Act was narrowly
tailored to protect the Government's interest; and 3) the statute reached only non-communicative conduct).
160. Vietnamese Fishermen'sAss'n, 543 F. Supp. at 209.
161. See id (citing Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886)).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 208.
164. 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).
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defendants constituted intimidation and had a substantial possibility of inciting
65
others to engage in acts of violence and intimidation directed at the Vietnamese."'
Although the court appeared to combine the fighting words and incitement to
violence doctrines," it nevertheless concluded that the militia's activities posed a
risk of danger that exceeded the scope of freedom of speech protection.'67
The anti-militia statute withstood constitutional challenge, and the court enjoined
the TER militia from engaging in further activities." The injunction permanently
barred the TER from activities including: 1) associating as a private military or
paramilitary organization; 2) engaging in military or paramilitary training; and 3)
parading on public land or water.169
In its opinion, the court essentially announced a policy of taking proactive
measures to protect against the potential of future militia violence. The court
warned that "the proliferation of military/paramilitary organizations can only serve
to sow the seeds of future domestic violence and tragedy."' 70 Such proactive
measures, if applied to anti-militia statutes in general, threaten potentially
impermissible restrictions on the first amendment guarantees of both the freedom
of speech and the freedom of assembly.
Despite the decision in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAssociation,not all anti-militia
statutes may be constitutional. While states must ensure their domestic security,
anti-militia statutes may be too "intrusive because [they] prevent militia members
from not only convening to discuss government, but also from gathering to converse
statutes may not be
about anything.'' Under this interpretation, anti-militia
72
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive the O'Brien test.
Because expression restricted by anti-militia statutes is anti-government
sentiment, which may be classified as political speech,"I these statutes may require
strict scrutiny. Political speech may warrant a higher level of scrutiny than ordinary
74
speech because "free political discussion" is fundamental to the Constitution.'
Therefore, if a court categorizes militia speech as political speech, the statute as
written may be too broad to withstand strict scrutiny or to pass the O'Brien test.
On the other hand, courts may not characterize the anti-militia statute as
restricting political speech. In Dennis v. United States, 75 a case analyzing first

165. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n, 543 F. Supp. at 208.
166. Somewhat confusing is the difference between the clear and present danger doctrine, re-formulated as
the "incitement to imminent violence" doctrine inBrandenburg, and the "fighting words" doctrine set forth in
Chaplinsky. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. These doctrines may be distinguished as follows: "Whereas the clear

and present danger doctrine looks to the actual danger presented [to the public] by the circumstances, the fighting
words doctrine looks to whether the speech is likely to cause the average person to fight." JEROME A.BARRON &
C. THOMAS DENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW INANUTSHELL 73 (1993).
167. See Vietnamese Fishermen'sAss'n, 543 F. Supp. at 208.

168. See id. at 220.
169. See id. at 219.
170.
171.

Id
Bazemore, supra note 37, at 231.

172. Although the Court never specifically addressed the narrowly tailored prong of O'Brien, it held that the
statute satisfied the O'Brien test. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n, 543 F. Supp. at 209.
173. See Bazemore, supra note 37, at 231.
174. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,708 (1969) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254, 270 (1964)).
175. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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amendment protections of anti-government speech, Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence distinguished between political speech that advocates legal change in
the political system and political speech that advocates illegal change. 176 In making
this determination, Justice Frankfurter considered the aims, goals and methods of
the political party's organization. 177 Since the party advocated overthrowing the
government by force and violence, an illegal means of creating political change, he
justified restricting the freedom of speech.7 8 In some cases, however, the courts
have been reluctant to apply different standards of protection by ranking categories
of speech. 179 In any case, the constitutionality of anti-militia statutes remains
uncertain. It is likely, however, that carefully written anti-militia statutes will
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Anti-paramilitary training statutes may present a solution to the "narrowly
tailored" problem. Similar to anti-militia statutes, anti-paramilitary training statutes
generally prohibit any act that involves the assembly of "one or more persons for
the purpose of training with, practicing or being instructed in the use of any
[weapon] in furtherance of civil disorder [or] teaches or demonstrates to any other
person the use, application, or making of any firearm... in the furtherance of civil
disorder .... ""',Because of the prohibition on training, rather than a wholesale ban
on the militias, anti-paramilitary training statutes appear to be more narrowly
tailored than anti-militia statutes.
Both anti-militia and anti-paramilitary training statutes raise questions of
constitutionally under the first amendment. However, if the Vietnamese Fisherman's Association case serves as an indication of the constitutionality of the antimilitia statutes, it is likely that paramilitary statutes will be valid as well. Even if
anti-militia statutes are found to violate the constitution, anti-paramilitary training
statutes may survive constitutional scrutiny as they impose fewer restrictions on the
first amendment rights of militia members.
Incitement to Imminent Lawless Violence Exception to First Amendment
Freedom of Speech
Understanding the incitement to imminent lawless action or violence exception
to first amendment protections presents a difficult undertaking. The incitement to
violence category developed over time; this development culminated with a
separately recognized category of unprotected speech in 1969 in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.'' Brandenburgheld that first amendment protections do not extend to speech
2.

176. See id. at 546 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that "[tihe Communist Party was not designed by
these defendants as an ordinarypolitical party .... The jury found that the Party advocates the theory that there
is a duty and necessity to overthrow the Government by force and violence") (emphasis added).
177. See id.
178. See id. at 547.

179. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that "the
Supreme Court generally has not attempted to differentiate between different categories of speech... [s]uch an
endeavor would not only be hopelessly complicated but would raise substantial concern .....
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-433.2 (Michie 1996).

181. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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that is intended to incite imminent unlawful action when the action is likely to
result.'
The clear and present danger test, set forth in 1919 in Schenk v. United States, 83
supplied the framework that constructed the incitement to violence exception. For
these reasons, the pre-Brandenburgcases provide a useful history of the integration
of incitement to violence concepts in the application of the clear and present danger
doctrine.
Some of the first cases that addressed incitement to violence involved anticommunism sentiment.' For many people, the anti-communism cases carry the
stigma of an era in American history riddled with xenophobia and governmentsanctioned persecution. This Comment does not support the Court's decisions in the
anti-communism cases. 85 Instead, the cases are useful in the application of
incitement to violence as a legal mechanism that, when used with prudence and
responsibility, may serve to protect people targeted by hate-motivated violence.
A paramount incitement to violence case was Gitlow v. New York 86 The
defendant in Gitlow was convicted under a criminal anarchy statute for advocating
the violent overthrow of the government by printing and distributing 16,000 papers
advocating Communism.18 The primary issue in Gitlow was whether the application
of the statute deprived the defendant of the freedom of speech.' 88
In analyzing the statute, the Court determined that it did not violate the
constitution. The Court emphasized its unwillingness to protect unlawful
expressions under the first amendment.' 89 The Court reasoned that "utterances
inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, present a
sufficient danger ... to bring their punishment within the range of legislative
discretions ... Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public
peace and to the security of the State."'90
Turning to whether the defendant's activities violated the statute, the Court
carefully analyzed specific language in the defendant's documents. The primary
document distributed by the defendant, The Manifesto, stated in part, "[tihe
proletariat revolution and the Communist reconstruction of society-the struggle
for these-is now indispensable. . . . The Communist International calls the
proletariat of the world to the final struggle!"' 9' The Court found that the language

182. See id.
183. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that Congress has a right to restrict words that are used in "such
circumstances and are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger.... ")
184. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
185. Interestingly, anti-communism sentiment has been a tool used by the right to provoke fear, in the same

way that conspiracy theories are currently being used against targeted groups. "[An extreme fear of communism,
conceptualized as a 'red menace' ... became institutionalized in the American political scene ....
See BERLET,
supra note 19, at 31. In the form of a conspiracy theory, communism threatened to "steer the U.S. from a Godcentered society to a socialist, atheistic society." See id.
186. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
187. Seeid at654.
188. See id. at664.
189. See id. at 666-67.
190. Id. at 669.
191. Id. at 665.
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"fervently" advocated action to overthrow and destroy the government. 92
' The Court
also held that the language was "not the expression of philosophical abstraction, the
mere prediction of future events; [but] the language of direct incitement."1' 93 As
such, the Court denied first amendment protection to language that advocated,
advised, and taught the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means., 94
Forty years later, in Dennis v. United States, 95 the Supreme Court affirmed the
"incitement to violence" theory. In Dennis, defendants were convicted of violating
the Smith Act.' 96 The Smith Act prohibited any person from 1) knowingly or
willfully advocating the overthrow of the government or 2) printing, publishing,
editing, circulating, distributing or publicly displaying any written or printed matter
that advocates the unlawful overthrow of the government. 97 The issue before the
Court was whether the application of the Smith Act violated the defendants' first
amendment rights.9" The Court affirmed the conviction holding that the first
amendment did not protect the defendant's activities because the activities posed
an immediate threat of danger to overthrow the government, and in doing so
violated the Smith Act. 199
The Dennis Court applied the clear and present danger doctrine." The doctrine
permits restricting first amendment protection to words that create a "clear and
present danger" based on the circumstances surrounding the speech.2"' To determine
whether a compelling state interest warranted restricting the freedom of speech, the
Court reasoned that the "overthrow of government by force and violence is certainly
substantial enough for the government to limit speech. Indeed it is the ultimate
value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed
internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be protected." 2"
The Court clarified the difference between advocating violence and enabling free
political and theoretical discussion. "Congress did not intend to eradicate the free
discussion of political theories, to destroy the traditional rights of Americans to
discuss and evaluate ideas without fear of governmental sanction. Rather, Congress
was concerned with [the advocacy of government overthrow]."20 3 The distinction
between advocacy and incitement was further defined 18 years later in Brandenburg
v. Ohio.2°4
In Brandenburg,the appellant, a member of the KKK, was charged for violating
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act, which punished a person who "advocate[d] or
[taught] the duty, necessity, or propriety' of violence.... " 20 5 The charges were

192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 664-65.
195.

341 U.S. 494 (1951).

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Treason, Sedition, & Subversive Activities (Smith Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381-91 (1970).
See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 496.
See id at 501.
See id. at516.
See id at 508-09.
See id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 501.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See id. at 448.
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based on video evidence gathered by a reporter and cameraman invited by the
appellant to film a KKK meeting and rally.20 6 Portions of the film were broadcast
on television, revealing hooded KKK members with weapons.2 7 Several armed
KKK members gathered around a cross and spoke about Jewish and black people
in a derogatory manner.20 8 The film also highlighted a speech by a KKK member
wherein he referred to organizing a march, and the possibility of revenge if the
government "continu[ed] to suppress the white, Caucasian race ....
"
The Court found for the KKK, holding that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act
violated the first amendment because the statute impermissibly punished "mere
advocacy."2 0 The Court distinguished between the mere advocacy of violent action
and the actual preparation for it.2 ' The Court never determined whether the actions
of the KKK would have been classified as incitement to imminent violence.
The dilemma in Brandenburgwas the need to balance the constitutional right to
free speech with the need to ensure the security of the state. 212 Under Brandenburg
and its progeny, activities are entitled to first amendment protection unless the
activity directly incites, and is likely to produce, imminent illegal action. 1 3
Brandenburg essentially sets forth three requirements: 1) the intent of the
messenger is to prepare for action rather than teach or instruct; 2) the danger
presented by the action is imminent; and 3) the desired action is illegal.214 In order
to apply the incitement to violence exception to hate-motivated incidents, each of
the above-listed requirements must be met.215
Recent prison cases offer a different twist on incitement to violence, as prison
security concerns typically justify an infringement on first amendment rights.216
Many penal institutions have a policy of reviewing inmates' mail, and several lower
court cases brought by inmates in penal institutions have discussed the
appropriateness of institutional censorship of mail, literature, and other materials.217
Since the subject matter of the material most often censored by prisons is biasmotivated hate, the analysis of these lower courts is of particular relevance.
Prisoners are entitled to diminished first amendment rights. 211 In prison, an
inmate's freedom of speech guarantees may be restricted if the restriction meets the

206. See id. at 445.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 445-46.
209. See id.at 446.
210. See id. at 448.
211. See id.
212. See id.at 447 (comparing the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act to a similar statute in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), where despite first amendment guarantees, the statute withstood constitutional
challenge based on the ground that the risk of security to the state justified banning the advocacy of"violent means
to effect political and economic change").
213. See id. at 447.
214. See id. at 447-48.
215. See id
216. See, e.g., Murphy v. Missouri Dep'tofCorrections, 814 F.2d 1252,1254 (8th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter

Murphy 11].
217. See id.
at 1254; Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Knecht v. Collins, 903 F.
Supp. 1193, 1200 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1155 (5th Cir. 1986).
218. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,524 (1984).
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test from Turnerv. Safley.21 9 To determine if the restriction is legitimate, the courts
must consider several factors: 1) whether there is a "'valid, rational connection'
between the regulation [at issue] and the legitimate governmental interest;" 2)
"whether there are alternative means of exercising the rights that remain open to
prison inmates;" 3) what impact the accommodation "will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;" and 4) whether there
is an "absence of ready alternatives."' 220
" ' prison officials withheld the following three letters
In Hernandez v. Estelle,22
from an inmate: 1) a letter from the KKK which contained characterizations of
blacks and Latinos as racial minorities subject to violence imposed by whites; 2) a
letter from the inmate's mother which contained remarks that the inmate and other
black inmates were in danger by whites; and 3) a letter that contained information
about discrimination against Chicanos, encouraging the awakening of the Chicano
movement and struggling for a "society with no bigots." 2
The court found that although the words in isolation would not necessarily incite
violence in a calm environment,223 the context of the turmoil and unrest at the prison
created a legitimate concern of possible incitement to violence.22 Thus, the court
held that the penal institution appropriately confiscated225 the mail because of its
potential to incite violence and threaten prison security.
Similarly, in Murphy if, 226 the court applied an incitement to violence analysis
to determine whether inmate mail could be censored without violating the first
amendment. The mail policy at the Missouri Training Center for Men banned all
literature or correspondence "from any organization that espoused the supremacy,
purity or separation of the white race. '227 In accordance with the mail policy, the
following materials were confiscated: 1) a paper entitled "Preach Bible Truth, Help
Stop This Sin," warning the white race: "We must use every legal means to stop this
sinful act against our people.... We can and will use force if necessary, in order
to preserve our Anglo-Saxon race ...[;],,228 and 2) a letter from the Aryan
Brotherhood which stated, "The only recourse we have is violence, anarchy,
mayhem, gorilla warfare.... We must search out and destroy that black plague and
exterminate all strains of this fungus[.] ' ' 29 The court of appeals accepted the district
court's determination that the majority of the confiscated literature would likely
"create 'a clear and present danger to security of the prison if released within the
institution. "230
The court further upheld the district court's order that only materials which
"advocate[d] violence or that [were] so racially inflammatory... to cause violence
219. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See id. at 89.
788 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1986).
See id. at 1155-56.
Seeid. at 1156.
See id.
See id.

226. 814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987).

227. Id. at 1254.
228. Murphy 1, No. N84-38-C 1985 WL 5573, at *4.

229. Id. at *5.
814 F.2d at 1256.
230. Murphy 11,
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at the prison" could be banned.2"' Therefore, the court found that the mail policy as
implemented operated as a total ban on white supremacist material, which violated
the prisoners' rights to free speech and to the exercise of religion under the
constitution. 232
In accord with Hernandez and Murphy, three additional lower court cases,
Knecht v. Collins,23 ' Golden v. McCarthy,234 and Haff v. Cooke,23 5 have addressed
the validity of prison censorship policies under incitement to violence theories. The
prison incitement cases can be distinguished from other incitement to violence cases
because prisons foster a climate where a violent outbreak 236
is more likely to occur and
prisoners have diminished first amendment protections.
On the other hand, the prison cases are also similar to the traditional incitement
to violence cases. The prison cases apply "incitement to violence" or "clear and
present danger" theories.2 "7 The courts gave consideration to the connection
between the prison environment and the relative potential of racist materials to
trigger a violent response. This analysis parallels the "imminent" requirement of
Brandenburg.
All the incitement to violence cases demonstrate the willingness of the courts to
restrict first amendment protections when security and safety issues are at stake.
Thus, the incitement to violence exception to first amendment may be more likely
to be applied in circumstances that involve a threat to the security of the public.
IV.

CRITIQUE OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED MEMBERS OF
GROUPS TARGETED BY HATE MOTIVATED VIOLENCE

A. State Anti-Militia and Anti-ParamilitaryTraining Statutes
The anti-militia statute in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAssociationv. Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan 8 protected targeted groups by enjoining the TER militia from
operating in Texas. In that case, the anti-militia statute withstood constitutional
scrutiny.2 39 Vietnamese Fisherman'sAssociation may indicate that anti-militia
statutes are Constitutional and can effectively protect members of targeted groups.

231.
232.
233.
Cir. 1999)

See id. at 1257.
See id.
903 F. Supp. 1193, 1200-1201 (S.D. Ohio 1995), rev'd in part on other grounds, 187 F.3d 636 (6th
(holding that materials advocating or inciting violence could be confiscated without impinging on the

inmate's first
amendment rights).
234. 937 F. Supp. 818, 822-23 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that the prison did not infringe on the first
amendment rights of the inmate when it confiscated a video containing violence).
235. 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that the prison did not infringe on the first
amendment rights of the inmate by confiscating white supremacist materials that advocated violence).
236. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524(1984).
237. See Murphy I1,
814 F.2d at 1256 (reasoning that "much of the excluded literature would create a clear
and present danger to the security of the prison if released within the institution"); Knecht v. Collins, 903 F. Supp.
1193, 1200 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (upholding a mail policy that excluded printed material which "incites, aids or abets
criminal activity ....); Haffv. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (upholding a mail policy that
allowed the institution to confiscate documents that "advocate violence"); Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154,
1156 (5th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that materials could be confiscated because of their potential to "ignite a powder
keg situation").
238. 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
239. See id. at 216.
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Until the issue comes before the United States Supreme Court, however, the
possibility remains that anti-militia statutes may impermissibly impinge on the
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly provisions of the first amendment.
The plaintiffs' victory in Vietnamese Fisherman'sAssociation may also be
deceiving because the militia in that case, the TER, was a sophisticated and wellorganized militia. Not all militias operate their own training facility, wear uniforms,
and operate military vehicles--elements that played a major role in the court's
decision to enjoin the TER.2 ° Anti-militia statutes may not be effective in situations
where a militia, although armed and engaging in military activities, does not exhibit
as many outward expressions of military activity as existed in Vietnamese
Fisherman'sAssociation.24 ' Anti-militia statutes simply may not apply to a number
of small-scale militias and patriot organizations which could pose as significant a
threat to targeted groups as the TER.
Moreover, anti-militia statutes may be difficult to enforce. Law enforcement
officials may be reluctant to enforce the anti-militia laws because of a fear of
243 law
retaliation. 2 Since militias primarily organize in rural communities,
enforcement officials that interrupt militia activity could become targets of militia
violence. In addition, law enforcement officials may have difficulty enforcing these
statutes or injunctions against militias considering that militias often operate
underground or in secret. 2"
Even if anti-militia statutes are enforced, the penalty for violating such a statute
may not be adequate to effectively deter militia activity. The sanctions for a
violation may be so insignificant that deterrence is ineffective. For example, in
many states where unauthorized militias and paramilitary training are prohibited,
violations are only misdemeanors. 2 "' In one state, the penalty for unauthorized
militia activity is only $50.00.2" Nonetheless, several states charge violators with
felonies.247 These states may better protect against militia activity because the
higher penalty may encourage compliance.
Anti-militia and anti-paramilitary training statues may adequately protect people
targeted by hate-motivated violence as demonstrated by Vietnamese Fishermen's
Association. Although the statutes have been enacted in numerous states, there is
no indication that the statutes are being enforced. The fact that militias are prevalent
to some extent in every state indicates that the statutes are not being enforced.
However, people targeted by hate-motivated violence may feel safer in a state with
such a statute in place. Even if the statutes disable only the most overt militias, they
serve the purpose of ridding society of a serious threat of violence.
240. See id. at 203-4.
241.

See id.

242. See id. at 205.
243. See NIEWERT, supra note 29, at 4.

244. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 18.
245. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN § 870.06 (Harrison 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-277(d) (1995); MICH.
COMP. LAws § 750.402 (1991); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 33-1-31 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.080 (1997); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 1321.6 (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5515 (Wet 1983).

246. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 33, §§ 129 to 131 (1985).
247. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-120(2) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.06 (Harrison 1970);
MO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 574.070(4) (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-109(2) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14288.20(b) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-314(C) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-433.2 (Michie 1996).
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B.

Incitement to Imminent Violence Claims
The incitement to violence exception may be difficult to establish with regard to
unarmed far and extreme right-wing groups. Brandenburgmay serve to limit the
utility of the exception for two reasons. First, it is generally difficult to establish the
248
"imminent" requirement. For example, in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo.,
the Court applied the incitement to violence doctrine, noting that strong language
may properly be considered advocacy, but if "followed by violence, a substantial
question would be presented whether [the speaker] could be held liable for the
consequences of that unlawful act."249 In that case, the Court employed a strict, if
not unreasonable, application of the "imminent" requirement, practically requiring
an actual injury before the imminent requirement would be met.
Second, there may not be a meaningful distinction between "mere advocacy" and
"incitement." The lack of such a meaningful distinction could render the application
of the incitement to violence doctrine unworkable. As noted by Justice Holmes'
critique of incitement doctrine in Gitlow,
[elvery idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted
on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the
result.25
Justice Black reiterated this sentiment in Brandenburg,stating that "[t]he quality
of advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction; and government has no power to
invade that sanctuary of belief. '25' Thus, due to the ambiguousness ofthe incitement
requirement, the determination of whether the requirement is satisfied becomes
subjective. A judge has the discretion to emphasize or de-emphasize the
"incitability" of the action depending on his or her own interpretation of the
circumstances surrounding the events.
The difficulty in proving that an action is "incitement" rather than "mere
advocacy" demonstrates that the incitement to violence exception may not protect
people targeted by hate-motivated violence. Nevertheless, overt militia activity is
likely to be excluded from first amendment protections under the incitement to
imminent violence theory. Arguably, the stockpiling of weapons, paramilitary
training, and recruiting and educating endeavors of militia members could be
viewed as evidence of a threat of "imminent violence" that is likely to occur. These
activities would seem to be precisely the type of expression that is not protected
2 52
under the "preparing a group for violent action" caveat in Brandenburg.
According to the Court in Dennis, the government may intervene even if the
militia is not a significant threat to the government. "Certainly an attempt to
overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

458 U.S. 886 (1982).
See id. at 928.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,457 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
See id. at 448.
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of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for
Congress to prevent." 3 Still, though, the "imminent" requirement of Brandenburg
may not be satisfied if the court finds that the militia is unsophisticated or poorly
organized, as this type of militia might pose a threat that is unlikely to occur. Thus,
proving a case against a militia may be another hurdle to overcome. Because
militias often operate in secret,2" it may be difficult to initiate a suit against a
particular person, or the group as a whole.
Targeted people will have little success, if any, invoking the incitement to
violence exception as protection against the threats of unarmed hate groups.
However, today's societal context may require a second look at the incitement to
violence exception as protection.
Looking to the prison and traditional incitement to violence cases as a framework
for linking speech with the context surrounding it, it is apparent that the clear and
present danger doctrine has always come down to the question of the degree and
proximity of the harm under the circumstances." For example, when viewed in the
context of increased societal hostility, as in the anti-Communism and prison cases,
the Court seems willing to trim the protection of the first amendment as necessary
to curb societal unrest. These instances occur only when the Court perceives an
extreme threat of violence.
Given the history of racism and slavery in the U.S. combined with the presence
of high levels of hate-motivated violence and hate group activity, the U.S. can be
considered an intensely hostile environment for members of groups targeted by the
far and extreme right. In determining whether a particular instance of hate activity
or hate literature could satisfy the "imminent" requirement of Brandenburg,two
elements would likely have to be satisfied. First, a claim would have to be crafted
to demonstrate the context of hate-motivated violence in the U.S. as hostile not only
to targeted people, but also to society as a whole. Second, a claim would have to
show a threat to security or public safety.
Considering the context of the far and extreme right violence, compare the
following hate propaganda with the propaganda prohibited by the courts in Gitlow
v. New York,256 Murphy I,5 and Hernandez v. Estelle.25s
Our success will not be judged by how smooth the struggle goes, but how
rocky, for no revolution in history has ever come into being without great
resistance from those desperate to preserve their power. Our success will most
fully be determined by how widespread we sow the seeds of Racial Loyalty into
the minds of our people, and furthermore how we nurture these seeds and enable
them to one day bear fruit.... War and courage have accomplished more great
things than love of the neighbor. Not your pity but your courage has so far saved
the unfortunate... .5'
253. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 570 (1951).
254. See SNOW, supra note 6, at 18.

255. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
256. 268 U.S. 652, 659 (1925).
257. No. N84-38-C 1985 WL 5573, at "4-'5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 1985).
258. 788 F.2d 1154, 1156 (5th Cir. 1986).
259. World Church of the Creator, GreatSuccess to Come this New Year, THE STRuGGLE 1 (Jan. 27, 1999).
RAHOWA is the acronym for "Racial Holy War."
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We believe the Jew is the adversary of our race... and that he will always
do what he was born to do, that is, be the cancer invading the Aryan body politic
to break down and destroy the dross [sic] from Aryan culture and racial purity;
that those who are able to resist this satanic 'disease' are the "called chosen and
faithful... ." We believe there is a battle being fought this day between the
children of darkness (today known as the Jews) and the children of light (God),
the Aryan race.... We believe a racial nation has a right and is under obligation
to preserve itself and its members .... 2m
There comes a time in the decline of a nation when men must either take
some action or take up arms to protect their life, liberty or their property. That
time has now come to this once great nation of America.... [It] is time for Godfearing people to get livid with righteous indignation and either restore
LAWFUL government by any means necessary, outside of violence, or, if that
doesn't work, resort to force of arms.261
The above-quoted language is not unlike the language that courts have prohibited
as having the potential to incite violence. The only difference is the context in
which the speech was communicated. Given the similarities in the intent of the
messenger and the content of the message, is there a legal justification that permits
material in one setting, but prohibits the same material in a similar setting? The
statistics on hate crimes and hate activity answer this question in the negative.
Although the incitement to imminent violence theory is good law under
Brandenburg,it is rarely used as a protection to hate-motivated violence. However,
given the context of far and extreme right hate-motivated violence in the U.S., the
U.S. government has a compelling interest in protecting the safety of people
targeted by hate-motivated violence. Strict scrutiny can be satisfied in incitement
to violence cases if the regulation is narrowly tailored to address only hate activity
that aims to incite violence. Thus, incitement to violence may protect targeted
groups.
V.

THE CANADIAN APPROACH TO FAR AND EXTREME RIGHT
HATE-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE

A. State of the Law in Canada
Many countries around the world have promulgated legislation to protect people
targeted by hate-motivated violence. The prohibition of behavior and communication that incites violence or hatred is a common feature in much of the legislation.
Some jurisdictions that have promulgated legislation that prohibits incitement to

260. Aryan Nations, This is Aryan Nations (a brochure picturing a man in uniform carrying a knife and
holding two flags; a confederate flag and a flag with an "N" and a knife through it).
261. CRtAwFoRD, supra note 20,at 2.34 (citation omitted).
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violence include: Tasmania,262 Romania,26 3 Germany, 1 Britain," and France. 6 Of
particular significance to the U.S. is the recent anti-hate legislation promulgated by
the Canadian government.
The Canadian approach to social and legal problems should pique the interest of
the U.S. legal community for several reasons. Although Canada and the U.S. are
different in a number of respects, a multitude of factors bind the two countries
together. First, as neighbors, there is an increasing amount of movement of both
people and ideas across the border. In addition, both countries are democracies and
members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA). 267 Due to the
political and economic wedding of these countries through NAFTA, further
integration of the countries' social and legal spheres will likely follow.
Furthermore, it is important to understand Canada's legal mechanisms to control far
and extreme right activity since hate groups often mobilize, organize, and

disseminate information across borders. For example, more stringent sanctions on
hate activity in Canada may have the effect of funneling hate activity to the U.S..2

Canada struggles with hate activity, but on a much smaller scale than the U.S.. "

Hate activity in Canada has been documented since the 1930s.269 Unlike the U.S.

F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting system,27 0 Canada has no systematic mechanism
to track hate crimes. 271 However, as assessed by media attention and community
organizations,272 there is evidence that hate activity is substantial. 3 Many far and
extreme right hate groups exist in Canada. 4

262. See Tasmania Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, pt. 4, § 19 (Austl.) (prohibiting incitement of hatred on
the grounds of race, disability, sexual orientation, or religious belief via the following language: "A person, by a
public act, must not incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or a group of
persons ...").
263. See Romanian Law On Audiovisual Communication, 1992, ch. I, art. 2(2) (maintaining that
"[d]isparagement of the country and of the nation, exhortation to war of aggression, to national, racial, class, or
religious hate, incitement to discrimination, territorial separatism, or public violence, are forbidden by law").
264. See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulnessof ProtectedSpeech: A Comparisonofthe American and
EuropeanApproaches, 7 WM. & MARY BIL OF RTs. J. 305,322 n.7 (1999). (quoting Section 130, Incitement to
Hatred (Volkerverhetzug) which reads: (l)Whoever, in a manner apt to disturb the public peace (order), by 1.
Inciting hatred against sections of the population or calling for violent or arbitrary measures against them ..
Volksverhetzung § 130 StGB, 1985 BGBI. I S. 965).
265. See BRAUN,supra note 27, at 93-94 (noting Great Britain's criminalization of the incitement of hatred
in the Public Order Act of 1992).
266. See id.at 101 (recognizing French laws that prohibit the incitement ofracial violence, racial defamation
and racial slurs).
267. See 19 USCA §§ 3301 to 3317 (1993).
268. See BRAUN,supra note 27, at 42.
269. See id. at 39.
270. See FBI Report, supra note 7, at 1 (requiring the collection of hate crime data, specifically crimes
motivated on the basis ofrace, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and disabilities) (citing Hate Crimes Stat. Act,
28 U.S.C. § 534 (1990)).
271. See BRAUN, supra note 27, at 42.
272. See id. at 42-43.
273. See id. at 42.
274. See Thomas David Jones, Human Rights: Freedom of Expression and Group Defamation Under
British, Canadian,Indian,Nigerian,and United States Law-A ComparativeAnalysis, 18 SUFFOLKTRANSNAT'L
L. REv. 427, 453-54 (1995).
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As in the U.S., the Canadian Constitution protects the freedom of speech.
However, the Canadian Constitution contains a caveat which allows the government
to place reasonable limits on the constitutional rights of Canadians. "The Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
2'76 Therefore, freedom of speech in
justified in a free and democratic society."
Canada is subject to more governmental restrictions than the seemingly unalterable
grant of free speech in the U.S. Constitution. Hence, Canada may enact anti-hate
legislation without concern that such legislation inherently violates its constitution.
2
As such, Canada enacted the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA). " The
CHRA makes it a criminal offense to communicate propaganda that "incites or is
27
calculated to incite others to discriminate." The statute further prohibits any
person from communicating or causing the communication of "any matter that is
likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that
that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of
'
Prohibited grounds of discrimination in Canada are "race,
discrimination." 279
status,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital
2 °
granted."
was
pardon
a
which
for
family status, disability and conviction
Canada further reinforced the goals of the Charter by enacting similar laws in the
Criminal Code. Enacted in 1985, sections 318, 319, and 320 of the28 Canadian
Criminal Codes specifically criminalize the advocacy of genocide ' and the
incitement or promotion of hatred. 2 The following excerpts from section 318 and
319 show the specific language Canada employs to prohibit hate-motivated violence
to targeted groups.

Section 319
Public incitement of hatred-(l) Every one who, by communicating statements
in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group" where such
incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b)
an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Wilful promotion of hatred-(2) Every one who, by communicating statements,
other than in private conversation, willfully promotes hatred against any
identifiable group is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b)an offence punishable
on summary conviction.

275. See CAN. CONST. (Can. Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982) pt. 2(b) "Everyone has the following
fundamental freedoms ... freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and
other media communication[.]").
276. Id. at pt. 1.
277. Can. Human Rights Act, ch. H-6, §§ 12, 13 (1996).
278. See id at ch. H-6, § 1.
279. Id. atch. H-6,§ 13(1).
280. Id. atch. H-6, § 3(1).
281. See Offenses Against the Person and Reputation, Crim. Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 318(l) (1985) (Can.).
282. See R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 319(1) (2) (1985) (Can.).
283. Identifiable groups are defined under section 318 as "any section of the public distinguished by colour,
race, religion or ethnic origin." See id at § 318(4).
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The criminal statutes cannot be enforced without the permission of the attorney
general.28 4 This creates a sizable loophole against protection for targeted groups. In
addition, the freedom of speech and speech rights are protected by several
enumerated defenses to charges under sections 318 and 319.21
Under the charter, Canada expressly prioritizes the need to protect target groups
above the value of hate propaganda as an expression of free speech. The Canadian
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 319 of the Criminal Code in
Regina v. Keegstra.2s6 In that case, the defendant was charged with willfully
promoting hatred. 2s The issue before the Court was whether section 319(2) of the
Criminal Code violated the Canadian Constitution."
Justice Dickson eloquently summarized the government's interest in restricting
hate propaganda:
Hate propaganda seriously threatens both the enthusiasm with which the value
of equality is accepted and acted upon by society and the connection of target
group members to their community. Section 319(2) therefore relates to
objectives of pressing and substantial concern sufficient to warrant overriding
the constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression. 2"
Although the court in Keegstra ultimately upheld the Canadian anti-hate laws,
they have aroused much controversy. Justice McLachlin announced his position on
the constitutional restraints of Canada's freedom of expression protections in his
dissent.' McLachlin argued that Keegstraimposes an unconstitutional limit on the
freedom of speech. "[I]f one starts from the premise that the speech covered by
section 319(2) [of the Criminal Code] is dangerous and without value, then it is
simple to conclude that none of the commonly
offered justifications for protecting
291
freedom of expression are served by it.9
An additional argument against the constitutionality of sections 318, 319 and 320
of the Criminal Code is their potential to limit so-called "violent expressions" of
speech without actual harm being inflicted. One Canadian scholar argues, "[i]n
relaxing the standard of review to justify limits on low value expression, [recent
cases] may have prohibited expressive activity in the absence of harm." 2 This
view, which is at the heart of the controversy, attacks the very meaning of

284. See id. ch. C-46, § 318(3); §319(6) (2).
285. Section 319(3) of the Criminal Code states:
No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2) (a) if he establishes that the
statements communicated were true; (b) if,in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish
by argument an opinion on a religious subject; (c) if the statements were relevant to any subject
of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable
grounds he believed them to be true; or (d) if,
in good faith, he intended to point out, for the

purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an
identifiable group in Canada.
286. See [1990] 61 C.C.C. 3d 1,7 (Can.).
287. See idat 2.
288. See idat 2-3.
289. Id. at 3.
290. See id at 74-127.

291. Idat 106.
292. Jamie Cameron, The Past, Present and Future ofExpressive Freedom Under the Charter, 35 OSGOODE
HALL. J. 1, 65 (1997).
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incitement, defined as "to provoke to action." 93 By design, the purpose of
incitement to violence laws is to prevent the harm that will likely occur, not harm
that has already occurred.
Despite these concerns, Canadian courts have continually affirmed the

constitutionality of the anti-hate legislation. 9' Thus, Canada's legislation stands as
a symbol of Canada's commitment to protecting the value of the freedom of speech
and the value of the lives of targeted groups.

VI. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO PROTECT TARGETED GROUPS
IN THE UNITED STATES.
The U.S. has excessive levels of hate activity and violent incidents in every state
in the nation.295 The first amendment protects hate activity on a multitude of fronts,
including the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and often times the freedom
of religion. In addition, militia activity may be protected by the second
amendment. 2' In the same way, members of groups targeted by hate-motivated
violence must not be denied protection under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. However, as indicated by the high levels of hate-motivated
violence in the U.S., existing laws do not adequately protect members of targeted
groups.
The U.S. should use Canada's Charter and Criminal Code as a model to approach
hate-motivated violence. Although Canada's Constitution allows more
governmental restrictions on the freedom of expression, the U.S. Constitution does
not impose an absolute ban on restricting content-based speech.' In fact, case law
permits the courts to balance the value of protecting expression with the interest in
298
maintaining social order and morality. State anti-militia and anti-paramilitary
training laws and the incitement to violence doctrine are two viable protections for
people targeted by hate-motivated violence if enforced on a federal level. Enacting
federal laws that mirror the state anti-paramilitary laws, and the incitement to

293. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 651 (2d ed. College 1985).
294. See Keegstra, 61 C.C.C. 3d at7; Ross v. New Brunswick Sch. Dist. No. 15 [1996] S.C.R. 825 1,100101 (recognizing the validity of the Human Rights Act while invalidating a school board order that prevented a
school teacher from espousing anti-Semitic views while off duty); Queen v. Andrews [1988] O.C.A. Lexis 64
(Can.) (reasoning that Section 281.2(2) of the Criminal Code which prohibits the willful promotion of hatred was
a reasonable limit on the freedom of expression).
295. See discussion of far and extreme right hate activity in the United States supra part II.
296. See U.S. CONST. amend. II,§ I (stating "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed").
Militia members assert their perceived second amendment rights as justification for the right of each
citizen to be armed. See SNOW, supra note 6. at 188-189. The primary arguments used to support the interpretation
that the second amendment provides an individual right to bear arms are that: I) the location of the second
amendment within the bill of rights implies that it is applicable to individual since the bill of rights was developed
in part to protect the individual from the government; 2) the plain language of the second amendment explicitly
refers to the "right of the people," which implies that individual rights are covered; and 3) militias existed before
the constitution and are therefore "grand-fathered" in the legal system as a legitimate military structure. See SNOW,
supra note 6, at 188-190.
297. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571 (1942) (noting "it is well understood that
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances").
298. See id. at 571-72.
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violence doctrine, may protect members of targeted groups from hate-motivated
violence.
Federal legislation would be the best alternative for three reasons: 1) to make a
statement that, given the pervasiveness of hate-motivated violence in the nation, the
U.S. values and protects all people within its borders; 2) to aid in uniformity and
provide a minimum level of protection to targeted people that the state governments
could use to adopt similar state statutes; and 3) to minimize possible questions of
constitutionality that may arise in individual state statutes. 29
Congress has recognized the need to address hate-motivated violence on a federal
level. Congress introduced, but failed to pass, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act
during the first session of the 106th Congress. ° In addition, in 1990 Congress
enacted the Hate Crime Statistics Act which called for the collection of data on
hate-motivated incidents across the nation.30 As a result of the Hate Crime
Statistics Act, the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting system has identified people of
color, Jewish people, and homosexuals as being disproportionately impacted or
injured by hate-motivated incidents 0 2 Having identified the need to address hatemotivated violence on a federal level, the next logical step is to promulgate federal
legislation to protect targeted groups.
A.

FederalAnti-Militia Statute
The state anti-militia and anti-paramilitary training statutes provide protection
for targeted groups, but this legal remedy could be more effective if properly
enforced. Enacting a federal anti-militia statute may serve as an effective means of
protecting members of targeted groups. A federal statute would aid in the problem
of enforceability as it would shift the burden from the states to the federal level and
put the authority of the FBI behind it. In addition, since the task of regulating
militias lies in the hands of congress,"° dismantling unauthorized private militias
would be an appropriate exercise of congressional authority. The Southern Poverty
34
Law Center has drafted the following model federal anti-militia statute: 0
A. Any two or more persons who associate as a military organization or
demonstrate with arms in public without the governor's authority shall be guilty
of a Class
misdemeanor.
B. A military organization is any unit with arms, command structure, training
and discipline designed to function as a combat or combat support unit.
C. This section does not apply to any school or college where military training
and instruction is given under the provisions of state or federal laws.

299. Federal issues may also arise with regard to the source of authority of federal power.
300. See S. Res. 622, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). This Act would amend section 245 of title 18 of the United
States Code by imposing a penalty on anyone who "willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use
of fire, a firearm, or an explosive device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or

perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person ... "See id.
301. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1) to (3) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
302. See FBI Report, supra note 7, at 7.
303. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 15, 16.
304. Southern Poverty Law Center, Center Attorneys Craft Model Anti-MilitiaLaw (visited Oct. 10, 1999)

<www.splcenter.org/intelligenceprojectlip-index.html>.
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This model statute may withstand constitutional scrutiny as it employs language
3 5
similar to that used in several state statutes that prohibit unauthorized militias and
3 6
0
Illinois.
v.
the anti-militia state statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Presser
A federal statute such as this would give congress the authority to regulate
unauthorized militia activity and would ensure the safety of all community members
against the presence of heavily armed militias.
Although no model anti-paramilitary training statute exists, a federal antiparamilitary training statute would present another alternative to protect targeted
groups. Although anti-militia statutes will likely stop the potential for armed hate
violence sooner than anti-paramilitary training statutes, a federal anti-paramilitary
training statute, being more narrowly tailored, may be more likely to withstand a
constitutional challenge.
FederalAnti-Incitement to Violence Statute
Under the first amendment as interpreted in case law, a federal anti-incitement
to violence statute may withstand constitutional scrutiny if narrowly tailored. In
enacting such a statute, the court would recognize a compelling state interest in the
safety of targeted groups in the context of the U.S. being unsafe in terms of the high
likelihood of hate-motivated violent incidents. A statute that prohibits incitement
to violence based on hatred could incorporate the requirements of Brandenburg
with the statutory language of the Smith Act which prohibits incitement to
governmental overthrow.' °7 For example, the language of such a federal statute
could prohibit
any person who speaks, prints, publishes, circulates, sells, distributes orpublicly
displays any written or printed matter, preparing or in any way orchestrating the
incitement of hate-motivated violence against any group or person and where
such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace or safety of the public
is guilty of a crime.3
B.

This is not a model statute. The proposed language, however, attempts to codify
the common law position while remaining within the confines of the first
amendment. An incitement to violence statute prohibiting the incitement to hatred
appears within the traditional bounds of the freedom of speech.

305.
306.
307.
308.

See, e.g., N.Y. MiL LAW § 240 (McKinney 1990).
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970 & Supp. 2000).
Paraphrasing part of section 2 of the Smith Act, which reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person-1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet advise, or
teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of
any such government; (2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government
in the United States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display
any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability,

or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government in the United States by force or
violence.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

The Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul"9 does not necessarily
defeat a federal incitement to violence statute. The R.A. V. Court struck down the St.
Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance which provided:
Whoever places on public property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct ...

"310

The Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that the ordinance was
narrowly tailored to reach only expressions that constituted "fighting words. 3
However, the Court found the language, "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender[,]" facially invalid because it "[went] 31even
beyond mere content
2
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination."
Under R.A. V., a carefully constructed incitement to violence statute may pass
constitutional challenge. The R.A. V. Court noted that the St. Paul ordinance did not
"[prohibit] only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as
opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner., 31 3 Rather, it has proscribed fighting words
of whatever manner that "communicate messages of racial, gender or religious
intolerance. '314 Therefore, under R.A. V., a statute that prohibits only incitement to
violence motivated by hatred of any kind may withstand constitutional scrutiny
because it does not penalize a specific viewpoint.
Even if R.A. V. is construed to have prohibited words that "incite violence,"
perhaps the climate of hatred has increased substantially enough since the R.A. V.
decision in 1992, that the current Supreme Court would recognize the greater
likelihood that hate speech would incite violence in the U.S. today. If so, a federal
incitement to violence statute would withstand strict scrutiny because it: 1) serves
a compelling state interest of protecting the public from hate-motivated violence,
and 2) aims at regulating violence, a secondary effect of speech. Thus, a statute
prohibiting incitement to hate-motivated violence, if narrowly tailored, would not
violate the freedom of speech provision of the first amendment of the constitution.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Free speech is subject to prohibition of those abuses of expression which a
civilized society may forbid. As in the case of every other provision of the
Constitution that is not crystallized by the nature of its technical concepts, the
fact that the First Amendment is not self-defining and self-enforcing neither
impairs its usefulness nor compels its paralysis as a living instrument.3"5

309. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

310. Id. at 380.

311. Seeid. at381.
312. Id. at 391.
313. Id. at 393.
314. Id at 393-94.
315. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Freedom of speech may be restricted based on the principle that some expressions
form "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."3 t6 The American legal
system is built so that laws may change to meet the needs of society as it changes
over time. Given the status of hate crimes today and the violence perpetrated on
particular groups, the legal community needs to re-evaluate the benefits of the social
value of hatred in society. If the legal community finds that the social interest in
protecting the lives of targeted groups-people of color, Jewish people, immigrants,
and homosexuals--outweighs the benefits of hate speech, then the first amendment
provides no obstacle to anti-hate legislation.
The challenge to the legal community is to be true to the notion that "the United
States is a society where all people stand on equal footing to pursue life, liberty and
happiness." The problem is notthe fact that thousands of people in the U.S. actively
promote hatred. The true problem is a society that refuses to act when human beings
walk as targets to hate-motivated violence.
LOUREN OLIVEROS

316. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).

